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The Pension Expectation as Constitutional
Property
By Peter M. Rehon*
Introduction
In April of 1950, John Daniel, a man with an eighth grade edu-
cation, became a truck driver for a company which had a collective
bargaining agreement with Local 705 of the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters. Daniel learned of Local 705's pension plan in
1955, and understood that he would be eligible for retirement ben-
efits upon completion of twenty years of employment with employ-
ers under union contract. He was sent descriptive information in
1958 and in 1969 which described the plan as one which would
afford security and protection for himself, his wife and his children
upon his retirement.
John Daniel worked for employers who were under contract
with his local for twenty-two and one-half years, uninterrupted ex-
cept for a four-month period in 1960-61 when he was temporarily
laid off due to adverse economic conditions and was unable to find
other work.
In December of 1973, when he was sixty-three and unable to
drive due to cataracts, John Daniel retired. When he applied for
his pension, he was shocked to learn that he was ineligible to re-
ceive any benefits because of his four-month involuntary layoff
thirteen years earlier.1 The trustees of the fund, composed equally
of union and employer representatives, explained that the plan re-
quired twenty continuous years of service to prevent complete for-
feiture of all benefits. Ironically, had John Daniel known, he could
have preserved his eligibility by making the two dollars a week
contribution himself during his four-month layoff.
In court, John Daniel sought recovery of his pension, alleging
that the fund trustees had both neglected to state, and had con-
sciously misrepresented, facts material to his interest in his pen-
sion, and that they had, as a consequence, committed securities
fraud. The United States District Court for the Northern District
* B.A., 1977, University of California, Santa Cruz; member, third year class.
1. Daniel's problem was further compounded by his employer's bookkeeper's embez-
zlement of the pension fund contribution for three months after his return to work. Under
the plan, this represented an additional break-in-service.
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of Illinois allowed recovery 2 and the judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,3 which summarized Mr.
Daniel's plight as "unfair in the extreme, shocking to the
conscience.
' 4
On January 16, 1979, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed,5 holding that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not
govern the area of pensions, and that John Daniel's complaint
therefore did not state a ground for relief in federal court.6
It was estimated that in 1973, over one-half of the American
work force, or over forty million workers, were members of and
participants in private pension plans.7 The combined sum of all
private and public pension funds in this country amounts to over
$500 billion,' and is growing at a rate of 10% a year,' representing
the single largest fund of investment capital in the United States
and the deferred savings of millions of American workers.10
Though these funds represent the sole source of retirement secur-
ity for most employees, only an estimated four to eight percent of
participants in private plans since 1950 have ever received any
benefits from their pensions."
The United States Constitution, and virtually every state con-
stitution, provides that persons shall not be deprived of their prop-
2. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. IM. 1976).
3. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. Id. at 1228.
5. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
6. Id. at 570.
7. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974,
at 207 (1976)(remarks of Senator Ribicoff) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA].
The President's Commission on Pension Policy has recommended in its May 1980 in-
terim report that "serious consideration ... be given to the establishment of a universal
minimum advance-funded pension system." THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POL-
ICY, AN INTERIM REPORT 10 (May 1980) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. Such a
system would substantially expand the portion of the work force covered by retirement sys-
tems other than Social Security.
8. J. RIKI & R. BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN 10 (1978).
9. Id. at 234.
10. To put this amount of capital into perspective, it represents 26.5% of the gross
national product in 1977, $1.89 trillion. U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1978, at 441 (99th ed. 1978).
11. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF Tm Comm. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 1ST
SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF TM PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY 8 (Senate
Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRELIM. REPORT]. Unofficial estimates range from




erty without due process of law.12 To determine whether due pro-
cess protection will be extended to a particular claim or benefit,
two questions must be asked. First, is the subject of the action
"property" within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments? Second, does the action of the government consti-
tute an unconstitutional deprivation of that property? s
This note will explore whether an unvested pension expecta-
tion is "property" worthy of due process protection under the
United States Supreme Court's current formulation of constitu-
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1; ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; ARiz.
CONST. art 2, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7a; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 25;
IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 1, §
17; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
13. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 490
(1978).
If pensions are determined to be a constitutional form of property warranting due pro-
cess protection, such protection will be afforded only when the impairment or deprivation of
a pension expectancy is a consequence of state action. While such state action is readily
apparent in cases involving public employee pension plans, it is not so apparent where pri-
vate pension plans are concerned.
Where the challenged party is a private actor, as in the case of a private pension trus-
tee, the courts will find state action only when there is a sufficient nexus between private
conduct and activity by a branch of government. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). This nexus may be found, for
instance, where government legislation commands, encourages or promotes constitutionally
forbidden activity. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
In the area of private pension plans, impermissible state action may exist as a result of
extensive federal regulation of such plans through the enactment of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as
ERISA]. State action may also be found where government regulation of a private entity is
so extensive as to give the appearance of direct governmental approval or encouragement.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-59 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455, 463-65 (1973); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973). For a
discussion of the pervasive impact of ERISA on the administration of private pensions, see
notes 173-247 and accompanying text infra.
There may be sufficient connection to the unconstitutional conduct to warrant a finding
of state action where the government provides subsidies or aid to the offending party. Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463-65 (1973). Courts have found impermissible state action
where the government has provided specialized tax exemptions which are the equivalent of
direct subsidies. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
Private pension funds and sponsoring employers are afforded lucrative tax advantages
when the plans meet ERISA's minimum standards. See note 212 and accompanying text
infra. The relationship between government regulation of private pension plans and the
"carrot" the state offers in the form of a profitable tax benefit might constitute an addi-
tional basis for a state action challenge. See generally Note, State Action: Theories for
Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 675
(1974). €
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tional property. It will discuss and apply the Entitlement Doctrine,
the theory by which the Court assesses whether due process pro-
tection will be extended to a particular claim or benefit.
Section I will trace the evolution of constitutional property
from the Right-Privilege Doctrine to the Court's current theory of
"entitlements." The Entitlement Doctrine will be criticized for its
inability to guarantee due process protection.
Section II will trace the development of the legal concept of
pensions from the latter part of the nineteenth century, when pen-
sions were viewed as a gratuity, to the present time, when pensions
are viewed as a form of deferred compensation for employment
services presently rendered. The latter view will be shown to be
anomalous in that it regards pensions to be "wages" yet permits
the employee to be deprived of those "wages" prior to the satisfac-
tion of plan eligibility requirements.
The last section, section HI, will assess the likelihood of due
process protection being extended to pensions under the Entitle-
ment Doctrine. Two points will be illustrated. The first is that
while the pension fund itself, a valuable pool of investment capital,
is afforded legal protection, the rights of employees who are theo-
retically the fund's sole beneficiaries, are not. The second point is
that the Entitlement Doctrine is inadequate to guarantee constitu-
tional protection to employees deprived of what is often their sole
means of security upon retirement-their pensions.
I. The Nature of Constitutional Property
A. Historical Background
Anglo-American political theory is premised on the protection
of property. John Locke, whose seventeenth century liberalism
substantially influenced the drafting of the United States Consti-
tution, saw property14 as the well-spring of civil society.15 Accord-
ing to Locke, property was granted by God to all persons in the
state of nature.16 Its protection was the reason people came to-
14. Locke described property as the sum of all human interests worth protecting. This
included "money, lands, horses, furniture, and the like," J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATiSE OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LErER CONCERNING TOLERATION 126 (3d ed. 1966) (1st ed. London
1689), as well as "life, liberty and estate[s]." J. LOCKS, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERN-
ENT 48 (T. Peardon ed. 1952) (1st ed. London 1690).
15. "The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property." J.
LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GovERNENT, supra note 14, at 123.
16. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 8:153
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gether in civil society;17 it was the source of political legitimacy 18
and legal efficacy.19 It was the sine qua non of democratic con-
sent.20 For John Locke, the protection of property meant the as-
surance of fundamental rights for all persons in civil society.21
The Utilitarians later reworked Locke's concept of natural
rights to suit the needs of eighteenth century industrial England,22
but laid equal stress on the primacy of property:
The institution of property, when limited to its essential ele-
ments, consists in the recognition in each person of a right to the
exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own
exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without
force or fraud, from those who produced it. The foundation of the
whole is the right of producers to what they themselves have
produced.23
The Framers of our Constitution, influenced by Locke and the
Utilitarians, wrote into the document their concern for the protec-
tion of property from arbitrary appropriation by a tyrant or a ty-
rannical majority.
24
17. Id. at 123-24.
18. Id. at 79.
19. Man "has by nature a power not only to preserve his property-that is, his life,
liberty, and estate-against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of and
punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offense deserves, even with
death itself in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it." Id. at 48.
20. Id. at 29.
21. This view has not been embraced by all with equal enthusiasm.
As Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote of the nature of private property: "The first man who,
having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying 'This is mine,' and found
people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many
crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have
saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows:
'Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the
earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody."' J. ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on the
Origin of Inequality, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 234 (G. Cole ed. 1950)(lst
ed. Paris 1755) (original emphasis).
Marx was perhaps more succinct: "The transcendence of private property is therefore
the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes ...... K. MARX, THE MARX-
ENGELS READER 73 (R. Tucker ed. 1972).
22. See, e.g., 3 J. BENTHAM, PANNOMIAL FRAGMENTS, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
221 (1962).
23. J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 218 (1961).
24. See THE FEDERALIST (A. Hamilton, J. Jay & J. Madison).
Some constitutional theorists view the Constitution as primarily an economic document
designed to protect the property interests of landowners such as the drafters. This view,
popular among Progressive Era historians, is best exemplified by the writings of Charles A.
Beard, particularly in C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913). Contra, R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956); F.
McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958).
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The actual definition of property, however, has been one of
the more difficult questions in the area of constitutional jurispru-
dence.25 While property at common law meant almost exclusively
ownership of tangibles, including realty, chattels and incorporeal
hereditaments,2 6 the constitutional definition of property has un-
dergone considerable enlargement by the United States Supreme
Court. 7 Property under the Constitution has come to mean such
things as a license, 8 old age and social security benefits,29 and
one's interest in public education,30 public employment,31 and in
continuing gas and electric service. 2
B. The Right-Privilege Doctrine
The first test devised by the Supreme Court to determine
whether a particular claim or benefit was "property" under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was the Right-Privilege Doc-
trine. Originally suggested by Justice Holmes while he was still on
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 3 the doctrine holds
that rights are the basis of all constitutional protections afforded
to citizens and thus cannot be abridged without notice or justifica-
tion, but that privileges-those interests bestowed at the discretion
of the state-may be revoked without constitutional protection.3
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated
the rule quite concisely: "Due process of law is not applicable un-
less one is being deprived of something to which he has a right.
3 5
The application of this standard has often proved harsh. In
25. J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 13, at 491.
26. T. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 211 (13th ed. 1924); 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON TnE LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 1-14.
27. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 387 (14th ed. 1978).
28. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
29. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
30. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
31. See Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (per curiam); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Contra, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
32. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
33. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). In
denying a petition for mandamus to a police officer who was fired for soliciting political
contributions, Justice Holmes noted, in his oft-quoted dictum, "[t]he petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
34. See also People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, alTd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
35. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afrd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
[Vol. 8:153
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Bailey v. Richardson," for example, the plaintiff was a nine-year
federal employee who was discharged and barred from all federal
employment for three years due to a finding of disloyalty by the
Federal Employee Loyalty Review Board. The finding was par-
tially based on her membership in the American League for Peace
and Democracy, an organization judged to be subversive by the At-
torney General. Although the plaintiff strenuously asserted her
loyalty and argued that she had been denied due process, the
Court held that her employment interest could only be character-
ized as a privilege, not a right,37 and as such could be withdrawn at
any time for any reason."
Similarly, in the private sector, the Supreme Court held in
1954 that a physician's license to practice medicine may be sus-
pended or revoked without due process since "[s]uch practice is a
privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary
power to fix the terms of admission."39 Appellant was convicted of
a felony for failing to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued
by the House Un-American Activities Committee, for which he
served five months in jail. Upon his release, his medical license was
suspended for six months by a New York State medical committee,
even though substantial evidence of his competence as a practi-
tioner and his loyalty as a citizen was introduced. 0
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion is fervent in its attack on
the Right-Privilege Doctrine:
The dictum of Holmes gives a distortion to the Bill of Rights. It
is not an instrument of dispensation but one of deterrents. Cer-
tainly a man has no affirmative right to any particular job or skill
or occupation. The Bill of Rights does not say who shall be doc-
tors or lawyers or policemen. But it does say that certain rights
are protected, that certain things shall not be done. And so the
question here is not what government must give, but rather what
it may not take away.
41
Justice Douglas suggests that characterizing an interest as a
"right" or a "privilege" does not define the nature of that interest,
36. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
37. Id. at 57-58.
38. "To hold office at the will of a superior and to be removable therefrom only by
constitutional due process of law are opposite and inherently conflicting ideas. Due process
of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he has a right."
Id. at 58.
But see the strong dissent by Circuit Judge Edgerton. Id. at 74.
39. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954).
40. Id. at 458 (Black, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 472-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Fall 1980]
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but merely permits a tautological conclusion that one demands
constitutional protection and the other does not. The dichotomy
provides no illumination as to why a particular employment, li-
cense or benefit is more or less deserving of judicial recognition
than any other. The Doctrine provides the labels for justification of
a particular conclusion; it does not suggest a rationale.
42
Without rejecting the tenuous distinction between rights and
privileges outright, the Supreme Court pared away at it by impos-
ing numerous limitations and exceptions. 43 Between 1926 and the
late 1960's, the Court developed nearly a half dozen doctrines
which strictly delimited the scope and impact of the Right-Privi-
lege Doctrine44 and all but stripped it of its efficacy.
The development and application of the various theories
which tempered the harshness of the Right-Privilege Doctrine be-
gan the gradual expansion of the concept of constitutional prop-
erty. Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the "wooden distinc-
tion" between rights and privileges.45
C. The Entitlement Doctrine
The final years of the Warren Court majority" witnessed the
recantation of the Right-Privilege Doctrine and proved to be the
high water mark of due process protection for previously unrecog-
nized property interests. During this period the Court employed a
balancing test in which it weighed the importance of the interest in
issue against the state's interest in summary deprivation. 7
42. See Professor Van Alstyne's discussion and authorities cited in Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439,
1459 n.63 (1968).
43. See id. at 1445.
44. See id. at 1445-58.
45. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 n.15 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
46. For the purposes of the present discussion, this refers to the transition pe-
riod-1969-1972--during which members of the Warren Court were replaced by appointees
of President Nixon.
This alteration in the Court make-up has resulted in a discernible philosophical shift in
certain of the Court's decisions. See Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal
Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 355 (1978); Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HAv. L. RFv. 1 (1975);
Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to
Size, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49 (1976).
47. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), and its companion case, Wheeler
v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971);
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Stating that "[m]uch of the existing wealth in this country
takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional com-
mon-law concepts of property," the Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly45 held that welfare recipients have a "statutory entitlement"
to their welfare payments and cannot be deprived of them without
due qprocess of law.49 The Court did not rely on its own definition
of the nature of an "entitlement," a term borrowed from Professor
Reich.5' Rather, it relied on its assessment of the importance of the
property interest to the claimant, as compared to the .government's
interest in summary adjudication.
51
It was not until June of 1972, two years after Goldberg, that
the Court, in Board of Regents v. Roth52 and two related cases,53
began defining the nature of constitutional property. This was a
departure from the balancing approach suggested by earlier cases
where the importance of the interest to the claimant was primary
in determining whether due process protections would be extended
to the claim or benefit:" "The question is not merely the 'weight'
of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of the interest
is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' lan-
guage of the Fourteenth Amendment." 5
The Court in Board of Regents included within the parame-
ters of constitutional property "those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives. . . ."5 The Court did not itself define con-
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Note, Non-Tenured Teachers and Due
Process: The Right to a Hearing and Statement of Reasons, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 100,
105-10 (1972).
48. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
49. Id. at 262.
50. See id. n.8. See also Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
51. 397 U.S. at 264, 266.
52. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
53. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
"[W]hile the Court has eschewed rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of
procedural due process, it has at the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words
'liberty' and 'property' in the Due Process Clause... must be given some meaning." Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
54. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 409 (1977);
Note, Board of Regents v. Roth: Procedural Rights for Non-Tenured Teachers, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 882, 890 (1973).
55. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
56. 408 U.S. at 577. The Court also noted that "[tlo have a property interest in a
benefit, a person must clearly have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
Fall 1980] PENSION EXPECTATION
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stitutional property, nor did it look to the Constitution for a defi-
nition. Instead it noted that property interests "are not created by
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits.
'57
Thus, in assessing whether to extend due process protection to
the property interest in issue, the Court will determine whether
"existing rules or understandings," such as state law, federal stat-
ute or a contract, "entitle" the claimant to his or her "property."58
But the Court's formulation of entitlements as arising out of
rules or understandings external to the Court and Constitution
5 9
make the Entitlement Doctrine a difficult doctrine to apply.
In Arnett v. Kennedy,60 for example, the Court splintered over
how to apply the doctrine, with three justices joining in the plural-
ity opinion, 61 two justices concurring in the result only, 2 and four
justices dissenting.6 The plurality held that a federal employee
may be discharged for making allegedly false accusations against
entitlement to it." Id.
57. Id. That the definition of property stems from state law is not novel. See, e.g.,
Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-44 (1944); Comment, Entitle-
ment, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89, 110-11 n.85. But see
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process,
1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261, 267-77.
58. In Board of Regents, since neither the respondent's employment contract nor state
law supported his claim of entitlement to continuing employment as a college professor, his
interest in continuing employment was held not to be property within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process protection was not extended to it.
Board of Regents was expanded somewhat by Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972),
which held that there may be an implied, de facto, property interest, based on the claim-
ant's subjective understanding and expectancy of a benefit, sufficient to support a claim of
entitlement, even though there exists no express statutory or contractural basis for such an
entitlement. Id. at 599-602. See also Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361
(9th Cir. 1976); Note, Property and Liberty Limitations on the Dismissal of Arizona Public
Employees, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 835, 837.
59. 408 U.S. at 578.
60. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). For a criticism of Arnett, see Comment, Arnett v. Ken-
nedy-A Dubious Approbation of Adverse Actions Procedures, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 153
(1974); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 13, 83-90 (1974).
61. Rehnquist, J., delivered the Court's opinion, in which Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.,
joined. 416 U.S. at 136.
62. Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurred in the result. Id. at 164.
63. White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, id. at 171; Douglas, J., dissent-
ing, id. at 203; Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting, id. at 206.
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his superior. The plurality reasoned that the federal act64 upon
which the appellee based his claim of entitlement allowed only cer-
tain minimum procedural safeguards and, as such, established no
grounds for a constitutionally protected property interest.65 Be-
cause of its holding, the plurality never reached the issue of the
constitutional sufficiency of the process allowed. 66
The concurring opinion by Justices Powell and Blackmun
agreed with the conclusion of the plurality but not with the reason-
ing. Both justices felt that due process had been satisfied by the
government in its discharge procedure, 7 but they reached that
conclusion only after finding that there was indeed a constitution-
ally protected property interest set out by the statute, a right
"conferred not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee. 68
Similarly, the dissenting justices in Arnett termed the plural-
ity opinion:
an approach which would render [due process] protection inappli-
cable to the deprivation of any statutory benefit-any "privilege"
extended by Government-where a statute prescribed a termina-
tion procedure, no matter how arbitrary or unfair. It would
amount to nothing less than a return, albeit in somewhat differ-
ent verbal garb, to the thoroughly discredited distinction between
rights and privileges which once seemed to govern the applicabil-
ity of procedural due process. 9
In 1976, the Court, in Bishop v. Wood, 0 held that the defini-
tion of constitutional property under the Fourteenth Amendment
must stem from state law and state law alone.7 1 The petitioner, a
North Carolina policeman, argued that his dismissal deprived him
of the property interest in his job without due process of law under
64. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (currently codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503
& 7513 (1980)).
65. 416 U.S. at 152. "In the area of federal regulation of government employees, .
in the absence of statutory limitation the governmental employer has had virtually uncon-
trolled latitude in decisions as to hiring and firing ... " Id.
66. Id. at 155 n.21.
67. Id. at 171 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in result).
68. Id. at 166-67.
In the Court's most recent discussion of the Entitlement Doctrine, Justice Blackmun
expresses similar dissatisfaction with the Court's analysis. See O'Bannon v. Town Court
Nursing Center, 100 S. Ct. 2467, 2478-85 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 211 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
70. 426 U.S. 341 (1976)(5-4 decision).
71. "A property interest in employment can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by
an implied contract. In either case, however, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must
be decided by reference to state law." Id. at 344.
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the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Stevens, 2 relied not on North Carolina case law, which was
inconclusive, but rather on the determination of the lower court
judge who "[sat] in North Carolina and practiced law there for
many years. '73 It was the opinion of the district court that the pe-
titioner "held his position at the will and pleasure of the city,
74
and the Supreme Court therefore held that he was not entitled to
due process protection.
The net effect of Bishop is to endow the states and Congress
with sole authority in defining the scope of a basic constitutional
right.7 5 This allows them to determine which, if any, benefits and
interests will be afforded protection under the Fifth and the Four-
teenth Amendments. A state or Congress need only statutorily de-
fine an interest as temporal and noncontinuous to defeat a future
claim of entitlement.7
When the Supreme Court allows state legislatures and Con-
gress to define the scope and nature of property under the due pro-
cess clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it delegates
to those bodies the Court's own authority to determine the consti-
tutionality of the others' acts, 7 and denies the overarching consti-
tutional character of the rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Four-
72. Joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ. Id. at 342.
73. Id. at 345.
74. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 504 (N.D.N.C. 1973), quoted at 426 U.S. at 345
n.9.
75. Cf. Glennon, supra note 46, at 363-66. Professor Glennon suggests a narrower
reading of Bishop to limit its impact on future cases seeking vindication of individual rights.
While such a reading is certainly preferable, at least from a civil libertarian point of view,
the Court and the circuits are not likely to so limit its application. See, e.g., Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624, 626-28 (1976)(per curiam); Bundy v. Rudd, 581 F.2d 1126, 1131 (5th Cir.
1978); Graves v. Duganne, 581 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1978); Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Bishop:
"By holding that States have 'unfettered discretion' in defining 'property' for purposes
of the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, . . . the Court is . . . effectively
adopting the analysis rejected by a majority of the Court in Arnett v. Kennedy .... More
basically, the Court's approach is a resurrection of the discredited rights/privileges distinc-
tion, for a State may now avoid all due process safeguards attendant upon the loss of even
the necessities of life ... merely by labeling them as not constituting 'property.'" 426 U.S.
at 353-54 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Recent cases confirm that the
Entitlement Doctrine represents little more than a revival of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), discussed in Note, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction?, 7 HASTiNGS
CONST. L.Q. 165, 182-215 (1979). See also Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980); Harris
v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Monaghan, supra note 54, at 440; Comment, supra note
57, at 110-11.




D. The New Property
In his seminal article on the changing nature of society and
property rights,79 Professor Charles A. Reich examined how
changes in economic relationships have necessitated a re-evalua-
tion of the traditional view of property and its attendant rights.80
78. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Bishop v. Wood: "There is cer-
tainly a federal dimension to the definition of 'property' in the Federal Constitution. .. ."
426 U.S. at 353. See also Glennon, supra note 46, at 375; Monaghan, supra note 54, at 434;
Monaghan, supra note 46, at 44-50.
One of the primary by-products of the present Court's definition of constitutional "lib-
erty" and "property" has been the substantial curtailment of actions brought in federal
court under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), to vindicate rights
abridged by state action. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See also Glennon, supra note 46; Comment,
supra note 46; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1486 (1969). The Civil Rights Act was enacted to provide a substantive cause
of action for persons whose rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been abrogated
and, more importantly, to provide a federal forum to which to turn in the event of an un-
constitutional state action. Whether out of fear of the expanding federal caseload of section
1983 actions, concern for the "debasement" of constitutional rights asserted to protect so
many diverse interests, or out of respect for states' rights, a petitioner to the Supreme Court
seeking relief under the Fourteenth Amendment is now placed in the unenviable position of
facing a court which will look to state law to determine whether that petitioner has a "right"
upon which to base an action against that very same state. As will be discussed infra in
relationship to pension legislation, the same paradox exists regarding the Fifth Amendment
and acts of Congress.
Allowing non-constitutional sources to define the parameters of due process protection
not only eviscerates the protection afforded to property interests under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, but also has an indirect "chilling" effect on other rights. In Arnett, for
example, Justice Douglas dissented, fearing that other constitutional rights would be im-
pacted by such a holding "There is more than employment and a job at issue in this case.
The stake of the federal employee is not only in a livelihood, but in his right to speak
guaranteed by the First Amendment." 416 U.S. at 203 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Property and Liberty Interests in Public Employment, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 242,
253 (1977).
79. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The New
Property].
80. Reich notes, for example, that "social insurance substitutes for savings; a govern-
ment contract replaces a businessman's customers and good will. The wealth of more and
more Americans depends upon a relationship to government. Increasingly, Americans live
on government largess-allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients
subject to conditions which express 'the public interest.'
"The growth of government largess, accompanied by a distinctive system of law, is hav-
ing profound consequences. It affects the underpinnings of individualism and independence.
It influences the workings of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 733. See also Reich, Individual
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Professor Reich's central theme is that the "new prop-
erty"-licenses, permits, franchises, welfare and unemployment
benefits and the like-is as basic to economic security as is the old
property. And because this new property is "steadily taking the
place of traditional forms of wealth,"'81 Reich argues that it is
equally deserving of Bill of Rights protection.a
To illustrate his point, Reich discusses the Court's treatment
of Social Security pensions in Flemming v. Nestor."s Ephram Nes-
tor paid Social Security taxes from 1936 to 1955. In 1955, he be-
came eligible for Social Security benefits-$55.60 a month. In 1956,
he was deported pursuant to an act passed by Congress in 1952, for
having been a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to
1939.4 His Social Security benefits were terminated shortly after
his deportation."
The Supreme Court held, in a five to four decision, that it is
not unconstitutional to deprive one of Social Security benefits to
which he or she is otherwise entitled, for engaging in lawful con-
duct.' Specifically, the Court determined that Ephram Nestor did
not have an "accrued property right"' 7 to Social Security benefits,
and that he therefore was not entitled to due process protection
under the Fifth Amendment. 8
The Court's logic in Flemming presaged the Entitlement Doc-
trine. To determine whether a property interest in such benefits
indeed existed, invoking the protection of the Fifth Amendment,
the Court considered the possible impact of such a finding on the
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
81. The New Property, supra note 79, at 733.
82. Id. Professor Tushnet suggests a revival of substantive due process as just such a
vehicle for extending protection to "the new property." See Tushnet, The Newer Property:
Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261.
For a contrary view, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abor-
tion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159.
83. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See The New Property, supra note 79, at 768.
84. Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(a)-(c)(1976)) made such membership grounds for deportation. Its terms were retroactive.
85. Section 202(n) of the Social Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
402(n)(1)(A)(1976)) allowed termination of benefits upon deportation of the recipient.
86. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Clark,
Whittaker and Stewart.
Justice Black dissented, as did Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and
Brennan.
87. The circuit court had found such a right. Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922, 934
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
88. 363 U.S. at 611.
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Social Security Act itself: "To engraft upon the Social Security
system a concept of 'accrued property rights' would deprive it of
the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing condi-
tions which it demands." 9
But if Reich's thesis is correct, and Social Security benefits
can be characterized as new property, then the government's asser-
tion of virtually unrestrained dominion over such property
amounts to, in Reich's words, the "new feudalism."90 He notes
that:
No form of government largess is more personal or individual
than an old age pension. No form is more clearly earned by the
recipient.... No form is more obviously a compulsory substitute
for private property; the tax on wage earner and employer might
readily have gone to higher pay and higher private savings in-
stead. No form is more relied on, and more often thought of as
property. No form is more vital to the independence and dignity
of the individual. Yet under the philosophy of Congress and the
Court, a man or woman, after a lifetime of work, has no rights
which may not be taken away to serve some public policy.9'
Pensions differ from other forms of "new property"; they re-
present more than mere government largess. Pensions are not be-
stowed by the state, but rather earned as compensation and de-
ferred by agreement until retirement. Reich's argument for
including new property within the ambit of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment protection has particular force as applied to pensions.
Not only does the pension substitute for traditional wealth in the
abstract, but it substitutes for and defers receipt of wages pres-
ently earned.
The next section will explore the evolution of judicial percep-
tions of the private pension, from gratuity to deferred
compensation.
II. The Historical Development of the Pension
Concept
While the purpose of the pension has been the obvious one of
89. Id. at 610.
90. "The philosophy of Flemming v. Nestor... resembles the philosophy of feudal
tenure. Wealth is not 'owned,' or 'vested' in the holders. Instead, it is held conditionally, the
conditions being ones which seek to ensure the fulfillment of obligations imposed by the
state." The New Property, supra note 79, at 769.
91. Id.
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providing economic security,9 2 defining the legally enforceable
rights, if any, of employees vis-&-vis their pension plans, has
spawned much litigation and is a subject of considerable contro-
versy. Though recent federal statutory law93 effectively occupies
the field of pension regulation, common law fashioned over the last
fifty years still defines the fundamental nature of the pension plan,
as well as each employee's rights and interests thereto.
A survey of the judicial treatment of the worker's interest in
his or her pension reflects 'a growing recognition that the pension
is, and always has been, the primary means of providing needed
financial security to the retired worker.
A. Pensions as a Gratuity
The first pension plans were those unilaterally adopted by em-
ployers to reward certain key employees for long and faithful ser-
vice.94 Most were informal and left to the discretion of the em-
ployer the size of the plan and the conditions precedent to
employee participation. 5
As a result, most courts in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries viewed noncontributory private pension plans as
mere gratuities granted at the sufferance of the employer and revo-
cable at any time for any reason.9 6 These plans generally contained
92. See P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FuNns AND ECONOMIC POWER 3 (1959).
93. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1975)).
94. The adoption of pension plans was not without benefit to the employer as well.
Pension benefits attracted a better trained, more stable work force and provided a powerful
incentive for both long-term service and industrial quiescence, particularly during the dra-
matic boom-and-bust cycles of the late nineteenth century. In fact, it was because of this
that craft unions originally opposed pension plans, viewing them as a tool to manipulate
workers into servility. In addition, the provision of pension plans was good public relations
and provided an effective means of phasing out an older, less efficient work force.
Because of these and other advantages, early shareholder attacks on corporate pension
plans as an ultra vires waste of corporate assets were largely unsuccessful. See Fogelson v.
American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948); O'Neal, Stockholder Attacks on Corpo-
rate Pension Systems, 2 VAND. L. REV. 351 (1949); Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension
Plans, 70 HARv. L. REV. 490 (1957).
95. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., INDUSTRIAL PENSIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 41-60 (1925), cited in B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS
UNDER PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 8 n.9 -(1961).
96. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944); Dolge v. Dolge, 70
A.D. 517, 75 N.Y.S. 386 (1902); McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98
(1898), afl'd, 167 N.Y. 53, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901); 42 A.L.R.2d 461, 464 (1955). See also Pennie
v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889).
While this view has been rejected by the overwhelming weight of American authority, it
has retained a remarkable vitality in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jones v. Cheney, 253 Ark.
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clauses disclaiming the creation of any rights in the employee and
reserving the right to reduce or eliminate benefits even after their
accrual.
In McNevin v. Solvay Process Company,9 7 the earliest case in-
volving a private noncontributory pension plan,98 the employer
unilaterally established a pension fund which was owned, con-
trolled and administered by himself and his trustees. In a suit by a
discharged employee for recovery of his pension benefits, the court,
in holding that such a plan afforded no rights to an employee re-
gardless of length of service, stated that:
[T]he scheme by which this fund is created is simply a promise
on the part of the defendant to give to its employ~s a certain sum
in the future, with an absolute reservation that it may at any time
determine not to complete the gift, and, if it does so determine,
an employ6 has no right of action to recover the sum standing to
his credit on the books of the pension ftmd.99
B. Pensions as a Trust
The next theory to develop regarding the nature of the pen-
sion fund held that it was a trust and that the worker, whose eligi-
bility had matured, had an equitable, but not a present legal inter-
est in it.100 This theory was rejected with regard to plans
unilaterally adopted and administered by employers,10 1 but was ac-
cepted as applying to so-called Taft-Hartley funds.02 These funds
were jointly administered by an equal number of employer and
employee representatives in conformance with section 301 of the
926, 489 S.W.2d 785 (1973); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 152 W. Va. 761, 166 S.E.2d 150
(1969).
97. 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), a/I'd, 167 N.Y. 53, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901).
98. The oldest case holding a public pension plan to be a gratuity is Pennie v. Reis,
132 U.S. 464 (1889).
99. 32 A.D. at 611, 53 N.Y.S. at 100.
The dissent here is worth noting: "[A]n adverse decision to the plaintiff in this case
would justify the discharge of employ~s who may have loyally and faithfully performed their
duties to the company for a long period of years simply upon a mere declaration that the
company had cause for dissatisfaction, and the employ6 would be deprived of the moneys
that he had fairly earned, without any remedy for their recovery in a court of justice." 32
A.D. at 614, 53 N.Y.S. at 106 (Green, J., dissenting).
100. See 42 A.L.R.2d 464, 471 (1955).
101. See Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co., 266 A.D. 315, 42 N.Y.S.2d 81, af/'d, 293
N.Y. 105, 56 N.E.2d 67 (1943); Dolge v. Dolge, 70 A.D. 517, 75 N.Y.S. 386 (1902); McNevin
v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), a/I'd, 167 N.Y. 53, 60 N.E. 1115
(1901).
102. See Assalone v. Carey, 473 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Gir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 459 (1960); Van Horn
v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948).
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Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley).0 3
The recognition of jointly administered funds as trusts was fa-
cilitated by the introduction of a third party-unions-into the
pension agreement, and by the passage of sections 301 and 302 of
the Labor Management Relations Act. These sections strictly de-
limited the conduct of fund trustees. The trust approach enabled
union trustees to compel employers to pay delinquent pension
fund contributions,0 but it recognized only a marginal equitable
interest in the beneficiary, 10 5 giving fund trustees considerable lati-
tude in the exercise of their discretion.10 6
C. Pensions as a Contract
In an attempt to avoid the harshness of the gratuity theory
and the vagaries of the trust fund approach, some courts have in-
terpreted pension plans as creating contractual rights in the em-
ployee, and as imposing concomitant obligations on the em-
ployer.10 7 The employer's plan, under this view, constitutes an offer
of a unilateral contract, with the employee's performance, in accor-
dance with the terms of the plan, constituting the acceptance. 10 8
Consideration is found in either the employee's years of long and
faithful service, or in her day-to-day work. 0 9
103. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
104. See, e.g., Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
105. See, e.g., Assalone v. Carey, 473 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Joseph Assalone was a
coal miner for forty years until he retired due to miner's asthma and athrosclerosis. His
pension plan was a Taft-Hartley fund which required that signatory coal operators contrib-
ute 30 cents a ton mined per worker into the pension plan. When Joseph Assalone applied
for his pension, his claim was rejected, primarily because the trustees had changed the eligi-
bility requirements three times during the term of the plan so that it was, in the court's
words, "mathematically impossible" for him to meet the eligibility requirements. Id. at 204.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected As-
salone's claim for relief, holding that the fund was in the nature of a charitable trust and
that "individual miners do not have a sufficient interest in the actual moneys paid into the
fund by the coal operators to justify a claim of forfeiture under the facts here presented."
Id. at 205.
106. See id.; Gaydosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Miniard v. Lewis,
387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d
744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
107. See, e.g., Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948); Langer v.
Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 161 A. 571 (1932); Texas & New Orleans R.R.
Co. v. Jones, 103 S.W.2d 1043 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See also B. AARON, supra note 95, at 9-
10; P. HARBRECHT, supra note 92, at 181-84; Comment, Private Pension Plans: The Pros-
pects for Reform, 5 COLUM. HuMAN RIGHTs L. REv. 465, 475 (1973).
108. 42 A.L.R.2d 461, 467 (1955).
109. Comment, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension
[Vol. 8:153
PENSION EXPECTATION
The leading case supporting the contract view is Hurd v. Illi-
nois Bell Telephone Co." 0 This was a class action brought by re-
tired employees challenging their employer's practice of sub-
tracting the amount employees received in Social Security or other
retirement benefits from the amount of benefits to which they were
entitled under the employer's pension plan.'
The plan was a private noncontributory one, unilaterally ad-
ministered by five trustees appointed by the Board of Directors of
Illinois Bell. The plan was amended shortly after the passage of
the Social Security Act to allow for the offsetting of pension bene-
fits with Social Security benefits.
The plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that such an amendment vi-
olated their rights under the agreement and that the defendant-
trustees, as fiduciaries, were obligated to act solely for the benefit
of the beneficiaries of the plan, and could not act to maximize the
employer's interests under the plan at the expense of the
beneficiaries.
11 2
The court held that the nature of the obligations under the
plan was purely contractual""' and that the parties were bound by
the plan's terms. Despite the questionable nature of the amend-
ment, it was nonetheless binding upon the parties to the pension
"contract."" 4 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted
that while the amendment "represents a 'reaching' for an economic
benefit" by the employer, it "poses a problem within the realm of
moral evaluation, not legal."" 5
Plan, 23 U. Cm. L. Rv. 96, 99-100 (1955).
It is this latter form of consideration which provides the springboard for the deferred
compensation view discussed infra, notes 118-49 and accompanying text.
110. 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. IMI. 1955), afl'd, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 918 (1956).
111. This practice is known as "offsetting" or "integration." It reduces the amount the
fund has to pay out as well as the amount of pension benefits received by the employee. See
R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 86-88 (1973).
112. 234 F.2d at 945. See also Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91
N.W.2d 772 (1958); D. McGILL, FuNDmENTALs OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 170-73 (3d ed. 1975).
113. "The pension plan is a unilateral contract which creates a vested right in those
employees who accept the offer it contains by continuing in employment for the requisite
number of years." 234 F.2d at 946.
114. "Plaintiffs have no cause for complaint if their net pension entitlement was com-
puted by application of the provisions of the contract as it existed at the time of their
retirement. ... We believe that plaintiffs have received the full measure of their rights
under the plan." Id. at 947.
115. Id. at 946. Similarly, the lower court had stated that "[w]hether the integration of
a private pension plan with Social Security to produce the results found in this case is good
policy or unfair and misleading to the employees is a question which the court cannot decide
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While the contract theory has been touted as a means of pro-
viding at least marginal legal protection for the employee-benefi-
ciary, no rights attach under the unilateral contract theory until
the worker has tendered full performance, that is, has satisfied the
plan's eligibility requirements. 116 But eligibility requirements have
proven so onerous in the past that they have been the primary
cause of widespread forfeiture among unsuspecting workers.
117
Thus, the legal protections provided by this approach have proven
ephemeral.
D. Pensions as Deferred Compensation
As was noted earlier,11 8 one variant of the contract view gave
rise to the notion that pensions are actually wages contracted to be
deferred until retirement.11 9 Consideration for the promise to pay
pension benefits- is found in the day-to-day employment services
rendered by the employee participant. 12 0
The seminal case supporting this theory is Inland Steel Co. v.
NLRB.12 1 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the National Labor Relations Board holding that
pensions are "wages" within the meaning of the Wagner Act122 and
were, as such, subject to compulsory collective bargaining.
23
It is significant that both the Board and the court of appeals
base their conclusion that pensions are wages not upon an analysis
of the function and purpose of the collective bargaining process,
but rather upon an analysis of the form and operation of pensions
for the parties in this action." 136 F. Supp. at 156.
116. See Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 250 F.2d 37
(3d Cir. 1956).
117. See R. NADaR & K. BLACKWELL, supra note 111, at 30-44; Levin, Proposals to
Eliminate Inequitable Loss Of Pension Benefits, 15 VLL. L. REv. 527 (1970); Comment,
supra note 107, at 465-67.
118. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Hunter v. Sprling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (1948).
120. Id.; B. AARON, supra note 95, at 10.
121. 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949).
122. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a) (49 Stat. 453 (1953), as amended by
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5),
159(a)).
Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the Act require employers to'bargain collectively with em-
ployee representatives "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.. .."
123. 170 F.2d at 255. See also Sheeran v. General Electric Co., 593 F.2d 93, 96 (9th
Cir. 1979); White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 1976); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936, 941 (6th Cir. 1970).
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in the workplace. As the Board stated:
In substance... the respondent's monetary contribution to
the pension plan constitutes an economic enhancement of the em-
ployee's money wages. Their actual total current compensation is
reflected by both [pension contribution and money wages].
Realistically viewed, this type of wage enhancement or in-
crease, no less than any other, becomes an integral part of the
entire wage structure, and the character of the employee repre-
sentative's interest in it, and the terms of its grant, is no different
than in any other case where a change in the wage structure is
effected. Indeed, the practice of offering retirement benefits in
lieu of current wage increases is not uncommon in bargaining be-
tween employers and employees' representatives.
12
Similarly, the court of appeals, in rejecting as "far-fetched"
the argument that a pension is a gratuity, noted:
Every day that such an employee worked his financial status
would be enhanced to the extent that his pension benefits in-
creased, and his labor would be performed under a pledge from
the company that certain specified monetary benefits would be
his upon reaching the designated age. It surely cannot be seri-
ously disputed but that such a pledge on the part of the company
forms a part of the consideration for work performed .... In this
view, the pension thus promised would appear to be as much a
part of his "wages" as the money paid him at the time of the
rendition of his services. 125
While Inland Steel represents probably the single most im-
portant case in the history of pension fund litigation involving em-
ployees' rights, its assertion that pensions are wages was not
novel.126 It has been noted elsewhere,127 for instance, that employer
contributions to a pension plan which ultimately benefit the em-
ployee fit the economic definition of "wages" propounded by classi-
cal liberal economists."2" And in the United States, the view that
pensions are actually wages deferred until retirement found early
124. 77 N.L.R.B. at 5.
125. 170 F.2d at 253.
126. As an assistant general counsel for the National Labor Relations Board noted
thirty years ago: "It would thus seem to call for no particular refinement of economic or
legal insight to recognize a pension plan, whether from the point of view of the employer or
the worker, as a form of compensation for the latter's services. In recognizing it as such, the
Board in its decision in the Inland Steel and related cases can hardly be said to have been
indulging in trail blazing." Quoted in Somers & Schwartz, Pension and Welfare Plans: Gra-
tuities or Compensation?, 4 INDus. & LAB. REL. Ra. 77, 83 (1950).
127. Id. at 80 n.16.
128. J.S. MiL, PmNCIPL OF PoLmcA ECONoMY, bk. I, ch. iii (1921) (1st ed. London
1848); A. SMITn, W.ALTH O NATIONS, bk. I, ch. vi (1933) (1st ed. London 1776).
PENSION EXPECTATIONFall 1980]
174 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
expression.129
By assessing the social and economic function of pensions in
the employment relationship, both the courts and Congress have
found pensions to be compensation for services rendered in a vari-
ety of different contexts. Pensions and retirement benefits are
within the Internal Revenue Act's definition of "wages" for pur-
poses of federal income taxation, as they are considered a form of
"compensation for personal services." 180 Pensions have been ad-
judged to be a form of wages for purposes of the Miller Act,131 and
have been determined to be wages under the Bankruptcy Act 32 as
well.
133
Probably the most dramatic characterization of pension rights
as wages has been in the area of community property law. A num-
ber of states recognize that pensions are a form of employment
compensation deferred until retirement and, as such, are subject to
community property division."3 However, the California Supreme
Court has taken this view to its logical conclusion, and has held
that nonvested retirement benefits constitute community property
as well. 13 5
129. "A pension system considered as part of the real wages of an employee is really
paid by the employee, not perhaps in money, but in the foregoing of an increase in wages
which he might obtain except for the establishment of a pension system." deRoode, Pension
as Wages, 3 Am. ECON. Rv. 287 (1913), quoted in D. McGLL, supra note 112, at 19.
130. Hooker v. Hoey, 27 F. Supp. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 107 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir.
1939) (interpreting § 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932). "It cannot be doubted that pensions
or retiring allowances paid because of past services are one form of compensation for per-
sonal services. . . ." Id. See also I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
131. United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957). The Miller Act extends protection
to persons supplying labor for the construction of federal public buildings. 40 U.S.C. §§
270a-270d (1979).
132. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4) (currently codified at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)(1979)).
133. In re Schmidt, 33 L.R.R.M. 2283 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See also Note, Union Retire-
ment and Welfare Plans: Employer Contributions as "Wages" under Section 64a(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 66 YALE L.J. 449 (1956-1957). Contra, United States v. Embassy Restau-
rant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959); In re Sleep Products Inc., 141 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
aff'd sub nom. Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 833 (1957).
But see the strong dissent by Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas in Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. at 35.
Embassy Restaurant was subsequently overruled by the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. See 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(1979).
134. See Note, Pensions as Property Subject to Equitable Division upon Divorce in
Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 168, 182-87 (1978).
135. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
The Court in Brown reasoned that "[s]ince pension benefits represent a form of deferred
compensation for services rendered. . ., the employee's right to such benefits is a contrac-
tual right, derived from the terms of the employment contract. Since a contractual right is
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Most revealing, of course, are the subjective understandings
and expectations of employees themselves. A California State Sen-
ate Committee, investigating the operation of pension funds in the
state, described the feelings of workers denied their pensions after
years of service:
These people now have no tangible benefits for their years of la-
bor. These people cannot understand why they have lost every-
thing. They feel that if they cannot receive a pension, they should
at least get their money back. They view employer contributions
as a part of their salary which was withheld. Today in many
multi-employer plans an excess of one dollar per hour is contrib-
uted in a pension plan for the benefit of retired or to be retired
workers. When this sum of money is forfeited, especially for rea-
sons that do not appear fair to the participant, the participant is
bitter because he believes that the money contributed based on
the numbers of hours he worked should rightfully belong to
him.1"6
The assertion that retirement contributions are a form of em-
ployment compensation deferred by agreement is consistent with
the way pension benefits are provided for in the collective bargain-
ing process.187 While at first blush pension fund contributions
made by an employer appear to be a unilateral benefit conferring
no present interest upon the employee, they are treated in the col-
lective bargaining process as a part of the entire cost "package"
over which the employer and the union bargain. 18 In fact, it is not
not an expectancy, but.. . a form of property... an employee acquires a property right
to pension benefits when he enters upon the performance of his employment contract." Id.
at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (emphasis added). Brown overruled French v.
French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941), which held that pension benefits were expec-
tancies only and not subject to community property division.
136. CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE COM. ON Bus. & PROF., PRELIM. REPORT ON THE OPER-
ATION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 24 (Comm. Print, Nov. 28, 1973). After hearing extensive.
testimony, the Committee concluded that the deferred wages view of pensions was "compel-
ling." Id. at 24-25.
Extensive testimony of retirees denied pension benefits can be found in ERISA's legis-
lative history, LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, and in R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL,
supra note 111.
137. See M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 119-21 (1964); M. GRANOF,
How TO COST YOUR LABOR CONTRACT 60-62 & 90-94 (1973); P. HARBREcHT, supra note 92, at
269; D. McGILL, supra note 112, at 19-21.
138. As former Justice Arthur J. Goldberg noted while itil General Counsel for the
C.I.O.: "The union and management come to the bargaining table with some appraisal of
how much money there is in the "kitty" for an increase. The appraisals are, naturally, differ-
ent. But it is the total cost of improvements which provides the framework within which the
union and management bargain. If the 5 cents, for example, does not go into a health fund,
it can go into a wage increase or two extra holidays or double time for overtime on Satur-
days. This is what collective bargaining is all about." Quoted in M. BERNSTEIN, supra note
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unusual for employees in a bargaining unit to take an increase in
pension benefits in lieu of an immediate wage increase. 139 In spite
of this, the employee's interest in her pension is a contingent one
at best, contingent upon the satisfaction of those eligibility re-
quirements established by the plan. 40
If pensions are paid as compensation for employee service, the
concept of a complex eligibility system involving age, length of ser-
vice and job stability seems like both a legal and a logical anomaly.
It is difficult to imagine, for instance, any other circumstances
where eligibility is necessary to obtain wages rightfully earned. Eli-
gibility requirements clearly reflect a view of pensions as gratuities




139. D. McGILL, supra note 112, at 26.
During World War Il and the Korean War, when wage stabilization boards effectively
froze wage increases, unions were successful in negotiating substitute increases in fringe
benefits, particularly retirement benefits. This contributed greatly to their acceptance by
unions, and the concomitant growth in size and importance of the funds. See P. HARBREcHT,
supra note 92, at 7.
140. The two most common eligibility requirements are retirement age and length of
service. A typical plan will require an employee to work ten to fifteen years and reach the
age of 65 to satisfy plan requirements so as to receive a pension.
Prior to the passage of ERISA, pension plans often set out unreasonable requirements
which not infrequently led to forfeitures. Such abuses have been exhaustively chronicled
elsewhere. See SuBcomm. ON LABOR, SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AND PusLic WELFARE, 92d
CONG., 2D Spss., INTERIM REPORT OF AcTVTrRIEs OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN
STUDy 119 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as INTER. REP.]; R. NADER & K.
BLACKWELL, supra note 111.
Eligibility requirements, forfeiture and ERISA will be discussed more fully in notes
184-239 and accompanying text infra.
141. Mr. Justice Marshall noted in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581 (1977)
that- "[While] it is obvious that pension payments have some resemblance to compensation
for work performed ... [t]he same observations,. . . can be made about any benefit and
therefore are of little assistance in determining whether a particular benefit recompenses
labor or rewards longevity with an employer.
"Other aspects of pension plans ... suggest that the 'true nature' of the pension pay-
ment is a reward for length of service. The most significant factor pointing to this conclusion
is the lengthy period required for pension rights to vest in the employee. It is difficult to
maintain that a pension increment is deferred compensation for a year of actual service
when it is only the passage of years in the same company's employ, and not the service
rendered, that entitles the employee to that increment." Id. at 592-93.
In Davis, the most recent case in which the Supreme Court has considered the "nature"
of pensions aside from Daniel, the Court concluded unanimously that pension benefits are
"predominantly rewards for continuous employment with the same employer." Id. at 594.
While this would strongly suggest that the Court has rejected the deferred compensation
theory in favor of a neo-gratuity approach, those circuits citing Davis thereafter have chosen
to interpret it narrowly, using it to determine whether a returning serviceman is entitled to
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Nonetheless, whatever their justification, the present function
of eligibility requirements is to guarantee the actuarial soundness
of the plan.142 Pension plans are deliberately funded to pay bene-
fits to only a small percentage of employees since it is felt that
employers do not have the wherewithal to provide adequate bene-
fits to all covered employees. Plan administrators know that, sta-
tistically, only a minority of those workers covered at any given
time will comply with all provisions of the plan; it is fully expected
that the rest will quit, transfer or die prior to the vesting of their
pension interest.
143
It is largely because of these economic considerations that the
courts have been reluctant to upset the delicate actuarial balance
of pension plan determinations."" Other economic pressures, ex-
ternal to the funds,145 have also made the courts hesitant to extend
employment benefits under section nine of the Military Selective Service Act when he re-
turns to his former job. See, e.g., Barret v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 581 F.2d 132, 135 (7th
Cir. 1978); Cohn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 572 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1978); Aiello v. De-
troit Free Press, 570 F.2d 145, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1978); Bury v. GM Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1262,
1266 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
Interestingly, two cases within the same circuit have interpreted Davis' language more
broadly, each giving it an interpretation seemingly contradictory to the other. See Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 962 (7th Cir. 1979), a/I'd 100 S. Ct.
1723 (1980); Daniel v. Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-45 n.43 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd 439 U.S.
551 (1979). See also Krouner, Employee Benefit Plans: Due Process for Beneficiaries, 23
LAB. L.J. 425, 431 (1972).
142. For a discussion of the nexus between eligibility requirements and actuarial cost
factors, see D. McGm.L, supra note 112, at 305-62.
143. See id.; P. HARERECHT, supra note 92, at 53-56. The most authoritative source
available indicates that only four to eight percent of participants in pension plans since 1950
have received any retirement benefits from the plan in which they participate. PRLiM. RE-
PORT, supra note 11, at 8.
The most optimistic estimate of the percentage of plan participants who actually re-
ceive pension benefits is fifty percent. D. McGiLL, PENSIONS: PROBLEMs AND TRENDS 40
(1955). More current figures indicate that the McGill estimate is overly optimistic. See 1
LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 208 (remarks of Senator Ribicoff)(estimating that
only five percent of all plan participants receive their benefits).
144. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978);
Tomlin v. Board of Trustees, 586 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1978).
As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Roark v. Lewis,
401 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1968): "The court is fully cognizant of the internal pressures as-
serted on the trustees: the size of the pie is fixed and variations can be achieved only by
changing the size or the number of the slices. There is no camouflaged design on the part of
the court to second-guess the discretionary judgments of the trustees .... It is for the
trustees, not judges, to choose between various reasonable alternatives." Id. at 429. See also
cases cited in note 147 infra.
145. As was noted in the introduction, the combined sum of both private and public
pension funds amounts to over $500 billion, representing approximately 26.5% of the gross
national product in 1977. Supra note 8. These pension funds in the aggregate own 20-25%
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the notion of the pension as wages to confer rights upon the
worker vis-A-vis the pension plan.'" In fact, the courts have
cloaked plan trustees with immense discretion in making determi-
nations of retirement eligibility and benefit payment.4 7 While this
may change in the future as more plans are challenged under the
more liberal vesting and fiduciary requirements mandated by
ERISA," there has not heretofore been any significant indication
that ERISA is amenable for use as a swift sword to vindicate pen-
sioners' rights." 9
As the foregoing indicates, many courts have recognized that
of the stock listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges and own 20% of all
financial securities in this country, including stocks, bonds and notes. SATURDAY REVIEW,
Sept. 2, 1978, at 11. See also J. Rn'KIN & R. BARxm, supra note 8, at 10.
While this sizeable portion of the American productive capacity is technically "owned"
by American labor, it is controlled by a relative handfull of banks, corporations and
financial institutions. Such control has led to, or has been facilitated by, intense economic
centralization. For instance, the ten largest corporate pension and profit sharing plans,
whose management is controlled by corporate employers, account for $20 billion in tax-
exempt funds. 1975 PENSIONS DIRECTORY, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 11 (1975).
Similarly, the ten largest institutional asset managers in the United States, charged
with control of pension and profit sharing funds, control $88.8 billion in assets at market
value. Id. at 55. They are:
1. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. $20.0 billion
2. First National City Bank 14.2
3. Bankers Trust Co. 11.0
4. Prudential Insurance Co. of America 9.8
5. Equitable Life Assurance Society 7.5
6. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 6.3
7. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 5.2
8. Chase Investors Management Corp. 5.0
9. Lionel D. Edie & Co. 5.0
10. Aetna Life and Casualty 4.8
While pension funds are ostensibly organized for the exclusive benefit of employee-par-
ticipants, those economic organizations whose existence depends on pension fund control
are likely to resist any changes which would redistribute the benefits of fund organization.
146. Compare the holdings in the areas of community property, notes 134 & 135
supra, and taxation, note 130 supra, with the cases cited in note 147 infra.
147. This is usually to the detriment of the employee plan participant. See Tomlin v.
Board of Trustees, 586 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 564 F.2d 1299
(9th Cir. 1977); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1976); Thurber v. Western Confer-
ence of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1976); Toesing v. Brown, 528 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1975); Giler v. Board of Trustees, 509 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975); Lee v. Nesbitt,
453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1972); Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1969); Gaydosh v.
Lewis, 410 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968);
Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
148. Note 100 supra.
149. See, e.g., Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Tomlin v. Board of Trustees,
586 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1978); Bueneman v. Central States Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 564 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1977).
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pensions, given their operation and purpose, are compensation for
present employment, deferred by agreement until retirement.
Nonetheless, the law views such "compensation" as affording only
those rights to the employee as are set out in the "deferment
agreement," that is, the pension plan. Despite the importance of
pensions to individual workers, and the extent of past abuse by
employers and trustees (often leading to wholesale forfeiture), the
courts have not fashioned a body of common law sufficient to pro-
tect the pension expectancies of prospective pensioners.
In the final section, the pension rights of beneficiaries will be
analyzed by applying the Entitlement Doctrine. The application of
the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment formula to assess the pos-
sibility of constitutional protection for employee pensions will il-
lustrate problems inherent both in the Entitlement Doctrine, and
in the lack of basic constitutional protection afforded to workers
whose earnings are deferred until-and often denied upon-
retirement.
III. The Pension Expectation as a Constitutionally
Protected Property Interest: The Application of the
Entitlement Doctrine
As was discussed in section I, for an individual's pension to be
recognized as "property" under the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendment, the individual must be entitled to that pension under
state or federal law.150 Such an entitlement may arise by operation
of statute 51 or contract.1 5 2
A. Pension Rights Under Statute
Pension funds were subject to only indirect regulation prior to
1974.53 State laws regulated pension funds as they regulated all
other trusts operating within their jurisdictions," and federal law
150. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-
52 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
151. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 100 S. Ct. 2467, 2475 (1980);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151 (1974);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Russell v. Hodges, 470 F.2d 212, 216 (2d
Cir. 1972).
152. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Hodgin v. Noland, 435 F.2d
859, 860 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
153. See D. McGmL, supra note 112, at 29.
154. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10640-10655 (West)(repealed 1965); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-78 (West)(repealed 1967); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151D, §§ 1-18 (Michie/Law. Co-
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addressed pensions almost exclusively from a tax perspective.
1 55
Neither state nor federal statutes provided any substantial protec-
tion for pension expectations nor vested workers with any substan-
tive rights other than those afforded to trust fund beneficiaries at
common law. 15
6
1. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
Towards the end of the 1940's, two developments changed the
focus of federal legislation in the pension area. First, due to the
passage of the Wagner Act,1 57 trade unions and union membership
grew and asserted a new power in the American economy and in
the work place. At the same time, unions ceased their early opposi-
tion to pensions and, instead, pushed for larger, more comprehen-
sive pension and employee benefit packages, and for increased con-
trol as well.158
The second major development was the growth in the number
and size of pension funds themselves. While in all years prior to
op 1976); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 60-75 (McKinney 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
49.64.010-.030 (1962).
On state regulation of pension funds, McGill notes: "The fiduciary responsibility laws of
the various states in theory applied to persons and institutions managing the assets of pen-
sion plans, but the reach of the laws and the scope of the remedies were considered by most
legal experts to be inadequate for pension plans, especially those operating across state
boundaries." D. McGH.L, supra note 112, at 29.
Currently, all state employee benefit statutes, as far as they affect the subject matter
described in ERISA, are preempted by ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1114(a)(1976). See also
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978); Recent Decisions-Labor Law, 11 GA. L.
REv. 715 (1977).
155. Since 1926, employers have been permitted to deduct contributions to, and in-
come from, qualified pension trust funds. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 404, 68A
Stat. 138 (now I.R.C. § 404).
The phenomenal growth in private pension plans is attributable in large part to sub-
stantial federal tax incentives offered for the creation and operation of plans. In fact, it is
estimated that private pension plans are subsidized through tax deductions amounting to
approximately $3 billion annually. 2 LEGis. HmST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 1619 (remarks
of Senator Ribicoff). Of course, this is vigorously disputed by some who claim that pensions
and their investments are afforded no special tax concessions and are taxed in accordance
with standard tax principles. See R. Gonrz, TAX TREATMENT OF PENSION PLANS: PREFEREN-
TLL OR NORMAL? (1969).
For a general discussion of federal regulation of private pension plans prior to ERISA,
see E. PATITRSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION FUND EXPECTATIONS 85-112
(1960).
156. See B. AARON, supra note 95, at 117; D. McGILL, supra note 112, at 30-33.
157. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976)).
158. This was due in large part to the restraints on real wages imposed during World
War II, and the return of a more security-conscious workforce. See note 139 supra.
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1940, only 659 pension and profit-sharing plans were established, 159
between 1940 and 1949 alone, 12,206 plans were created.160 This
growth in numbers was accompanied by a growth in importance,
both as a form of economic security for. an increased number of
workers and as a pool of investment capital upon which a larger
portion of the private sector became dependent. By 1950, the ag-
gregate book value of private, noninsured pension funds alone
amounted to over $6.45 billion""1 at a time when total United




The growth of private pension funds into a vital pool of eco-
nomic capital, combined with the concomitant growth of unions
during and after World War II, led to increased congressional pres-
sure to impose restraints on union control over pension funds. 63
This pressure culminated in the inclusion of section 302 in the La-
bor Management Relations Act of 1947,164 also known as the Taft-
Hartley Act.
The Labor Management Relations Act was the first federal
law to impose restraints on the administration of private pension
plans so as to affect the rights of pension fund beneficiaries. Sec-
tion 302 of the Act regulates pension funds by imposing restric-
tions on the payment of funds to employee (i.e., union) representa-
tives. It prohibits payments of any and all kinds of funds from an
employer to a union representative1 5 excepting "money or other
things of value paid to a trust fund... for the sole and exclusive
159. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DmP'T OF LAB., STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE
GROWTH OF PRIVATE RETIREMNT PLANS (unpublished, 1979).
160. Id.
161. SEC ANN. Rap. 307 (1978). See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, Soc. SEC. AD., Soc. SEc.
BULL. 3, 4 (June 1976).
162. U.S. DEp'T OF COmmERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrED STATES, 1972, at 386 (93d ed. 1972).
163. As Senator Robert Taft stated, summarizing the intent behind his efforts to im-
pose such controls: "[I]t seems obvious that if these funds grow rapidly, as they are grow-
ing-which is perfectly proper-they should be regulated by the Federal Government. They
should be in definite terms. They should not be subject to the arbitrary discretion of the
union leaders....
"The purpose is to prevent the abuse of welfare funds.... The tendency [of unions] is
to demand a welfare fund as much in the power of the union as possible. Certainly unless we
impose some restrictions we shall find that the welfare fund will become merely a war chest
for the particular union. . . ." 93 CONG. Rc. 4746-47 (1947)(remarks of Senator Taft).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
165. Taft-Hartley Act § 302(a) & (b), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) & (b)(1976). Thus, a telling
feature of Taft-Hartley's § 302 is its application only to pension plans administered in any
way by unions. It exempts totally from regulation those funds unilaterally administered by
employers. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in [1947] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, 1173.
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benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and
dependents. . . ."166
The Act goes on to set out a series of requirements for the
administration of these union-negotiated plans, 167 the primary one
being that such funds be trust funds jointly administered by an
equal number of employer and employee representatives.168
While section 302 was ostensibly designed to enlarge the rights
of employees in their pension plans,169 its primary purpose was to
restrict union control over pension and health and welfare funds. 70
The Taft-Hartley Act has no provision governing the specific
mechanics of pension benefit entitlement. Until the passage of
ERISA, plan trustees and employers were left to themselves to de-
termine what rights, if any, employees had under their retirement
systems.
17 1
Due to the narrow judicial reading given section 302 in light of
congressional intent, the Taft-Hartley Act does not support a
claim of entitlement upon which an employee may base a plea for
constitutional protection for his or her pension expectancy. While
other legislation was passed in the aftermath of Taft-Hartley to
protect pension plan assets, it was not until 1974 that Congress
undertook a thorough revision of federal pension law designed to
address the rights of individual workers to their pensions.
166. Section 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(1976).
167. Section 302(c)(5)(A)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A)-(C)(1976).
168. Section 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B)(1976).
169. See 93 CONG. REc. 4746 (1947)(remarks of Senator Taft).
170. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947).
171. See Lugo v. Employee's Retirement Fund, 529 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Pete v. UMWA Welfare & Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1275,
1283 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Cuff v. Gleason, 515 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 1975); Bowers v. Ulpiano
Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 426 (1st Cir. 1968).
The test applied to assess the legality of trustee conduct under § 302 has been the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Thus, before a court will disturb a benefit or eligibility
determination by a Taft-Hartley trustee, plaintiffs must show that the pension fund trust-
ees' conduct, in denying plaintiffs their pension benefits, was wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious. This approach was modestly described as "noninterventionist" by the court in Souza
v. Trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust, 460 F. Supp. 843, 847
(N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1976); Alvares v.
Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 166 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); Gaydosh V.
Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425, 427 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
172. Aside from periodic revisions of the Internal Revenue Code in the 1950's and
1960's affecting pension plans, the primary pension reform at the federal level in the interim
between Taft-Hartley and ERISA was the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act of 1958. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970)(repealed 1975). Described by McGill as "largely
ineffectual," it was repealed by ERISA § 111(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1)(1976).
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2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)
On September 2, 1974, Labor Day, President Gerald R. Ford
signed into law Public Law 93-406. Entitled the "Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974," it was Congress' first attempt
at comprehensive pension reform, revising mammoth blocks of the
Internal Revenue Code and Title Twenty-nine of the United
States Code. The result was labyrinthian, even by congressional
standards; it reflected numerous amendments, compromises and
revisions.
17 3
The primary goal of its drafters was to protect the pension
expectations of prospective retirees covered 174 under private pen-
sion plans.17 5 ERISA was passed in response to widespread abuse
within the private pension system,17 6 due at least in part to the
173. The law is 208 pages in length, consists of four titles, and has a legislative history
that runs well over 5,000 pages in three volumes.
174. The Act governs all pension and employee benefit plans, excepting primarily
those which are governmental, church-established, or outside the United States for the ben-
efit of nonresident aliens. ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1976).
175. See 1 LEGiS. HisT. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 210 (remarks of Senator Bentsen).
Congress set out the policy of the Act in ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(1976), "to
protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi-
cianries ... " See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2 453 (10th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Snyder, 430
F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), alffd, 572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978).
The protection of employees' pension rights was not the sole concern of Congress as it
considered its first attempt at comprehensive pension reform legislation. As was suggested
in note 145 supra, the aggregation of pension funds in this country has vested a segment of
the economic community with a significant interest in the future of private pension plans.
Their influence, combined with the recognized importance of pension funds in the capital
formation process, has made Congress very aware of the importance of protecting the funds
themselves: "[ERISA's] most important purpose will be to assure American workers that
they may look forward with anticipation to a retirement with financial security and dignity,
and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the necessities to sustain them as
human beings within our society. The enactment of progressive and effective pension legis-
lation is also certain to increase stability within the framework of our nation's economy,
since the tremendous resources and assets of the private pension plan system are an inte-
gral part of our economy." 1 LEGIs. HiST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 599 (emphasis added).
See also N. Lmm, ERISA AND LABOR-MANAGEmENT BENssrr FuNDs, at x (2d ed. 1975).
176. "All too often working men and women contribute to these pension plans only to
find when they retire that the benefits they had been promised are denied them.
"In addition, frequently the pension funds themselves are abused by those responsible
for their management who manipulate them for their own purposes or make poor invest-
ments with them.
"It is time controls were imposed to safeguard the workers' valuable funds. Genuine
pension reform will be achieved only by Federal regulation.
"In the absence of comprehensive pension reform legislation, abuses and phantom re-
tirement security benefits have been frequent." 1 LEGIs. HiST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at
207 (remarks of Senator Ribicoff).
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laissez-faire attitude toward the funds by Congress and the courts,
and the rapid growth of the funds. In the twenty-five year period
between the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA, external
factors such as substantial tax exemptions,1 " pressure by unions
due to the Inland Steel decision,178 and other economic factors
179
caused pension funds to grow extraordinarily, and become even
more prominent in the American economy. While in all years prior
to 1940, only 659 private pension and profit-sharing plans had
been established, by 1974, the year ERISA was passed, 455,905
new private pension and profit-sharing plans had been formed.180
Between 1950 and 1975, the year ERISA came into effect, the total
book value of the assets of private, noninsured pension funds,
which represent one-third of all public and private retirement
funds excluding Social Security, increased from $6.45 billion to
$145.17 billion, or a total increase or 2,251%.181
This exponential growth of pension funds nationwide was ac-
companied by widespread corruption and misuse of plan assets. A
study completed by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, estimated that of all pension participants since 1950, no
more than four to eight percent have received any benefits whatso-
ever from their plans.182 Another study, conducted by the Subcom-
mittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, in 1971, determined that the median income among those
who actually received benefits under private pension plans in the
United States was $99.00 a month, or a total of $1,188 a year.1 83
The extent and nature of pension fund abuse has been exhaus-
tively chronicled elsewhere.1 ' Employees and their beneficiaries
have been denied all of their retirement benefits after many years
of service due to death, 8 5 disability,8 8 discharge, 187 onerous vest-
177. See note 155 supra.
178. See notes 121-25 and accompanying text supra; D. McGILL, supra note 112, at
26-28.
179. See note 139 supra.
180. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LAB., STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE
GROWTH OF PRiVATE Rmarnmsmur PLANs (unpublished, 1979).
181. SEC ANN. REP. 91 (1978). See also U.S. DFP'T OF HEW, Soc. SEC. AD., Soc. SEC.
BULL. 3, 4 (June, 1976).
182. PRELIM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
183. 1 LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 597.
184. See note 182 supra; INTER. REP., note 140 supra; 1 LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra
note 7, at 207-08; 2 LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 1598-1601, 3519-22; 3 LEGIS.
HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 4790-5106; R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, note 111 supra;
Levin, Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Loss of Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. REv. 527,
531-54 (1970); Comment, supra note 107, at 469-73.
185. See, e.g., Freitzsche v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 705, 336 P.2d
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ing requirements,188 layoffs 89 and plant closures.19 ° While workers
have lost their retirement security due to criminal conduct by em-
ployers and trustees, the most serious forms of abuse leading to
wholesale forfeiture have been, on the whole, perfectly legal. These
include underfunding, 91 fund mismanagement, self-dealing and
conflicts of interest,1 12 unreasonable eligibility requirements9 " and
plan terminations.'"
The problem of forfeitures has been compounded by the lack
of legal recourse available to employees denied their benefits and
the attendant lack of recognition of their plight. As a California
State Senate Committee concluded:
The result ... is that only the exceptionally persistent pension
victim ever receives any official or public notice. The vast major-
ity are either too intimidated or unsophisticated to even attempt
to protest their treatment, or are eventually forced to give up due
to the inability or unwillingness or anyone to aid them.198
It was this void in the protection of employees' rights that
ERISA was designed to fill. While some commentators saw ERISA
as the cutting edge of "pension fund socialism" in America,198 it
589 (1959).
186. See, e.g., Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965).
187. See, e.g., Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958); Gorr v.
Consolidated Foods, Inc., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958).
188. See note 140 supra. See also Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, 254 F.2d 827 (2d
Cir. 1958).
189. Askinas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 330 Mass. 103, 111 N.E.2d 740 (1953).
190. See, e.g., Local Z040 v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959). See also Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights when Plants Shut Down:
Problems and Some Proposals, 76 HARv. L. REv. 952 (1963).
191. See Bernstein's discussion of Studebaker, supra note 137, at 94-95; INTER REP.,
supra note 140, at 80-81.
192. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971); R. BLODGETT, CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST. UNION PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT (1977); J. BROOKS, CONFLICTS OF IN-
TERES. CORPORATE PENSION FUND ASsET MANAGEMENT (1975); R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL,
supra note 111, at 65-78; Bradner, Conflicts of Interest in Commercial Bank Trust Depart-
ments and Corporate Fund Asset Management, 114 TRusTS & EST. 786 (1975).
193. Gaydosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864
(D.C. Cir. 1967); McCostis v. Nashua Pressman Union, 109 N.H. 226, 248 A.2d 85 (1968).
194. Gorr v. Consolidated Foods, Inc., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958).
195. CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE COMM. ON BUS. & PROF., PRELIM. REPORT ON THE OPER-
ATION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 10 (Comm. Print, Nov. 28, 1973).
196. P. DRUCKER, Tim UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SocAuLIsM CAM TO
AMERICA 11-16 (1976).
Senator Metcalf calls Professor Drucker's assertion that workers own the means of capi-
tal production in this country through pension funds a "major, monstrous myth." Retire-
ment Income: A Report from the Pension Rights Center 11, col. 3 (1979).
As P. Harbrecht notes: 'Rights of ownership are a source of power only so long as they
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actually constituted an elaborate compromise between the rights of
the employees who rely on private pension plans for their retire-
ment years and the interests of employers, trustees and the invest-
ment community who have a substantial stake in pension funds
themselves. As President Ford stated upon signing ERISA in 1974:
"I believe this act is a model of what can be done by the Govern-
ment to improve the lives of Americans within the private sector
without harming the dynamics of our free enterprise system.
1 97
This compromise manifests itself in the complexity of ERISA,
its evolution and its numerous amendments.19 s More particularly,
it reveals itself in various provisions of the bill designed to offer
remedial protection for employees' pension expectations while se-
curing the interests of others who have an economic stake in the
funds.
One example is ERISA's fiduciary provisions, 199 touted for the
strong restraints they impose on trustee and asset manager con-
duct.2 00 In essence, ERISA requires that fiduciaries, as defined
under the Act,2 01 conduct themselves (1) for the exclusive benefit
of the plan participants and their beneficiaries; 2 2 and (2) "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and famil-
iar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
a like character and with like aims."203 ERISA's fiduciary provi-
sions also require the diversification of the pension trust portfo-
lio20 and disallow certain "prohibited transactions" as defined
are joined with the right to control the use of property." P. HARBRECHT, supra note 92, at
278.
197. Statement on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1974 PuB.
PAPERS, GERALD R. FORD 79. Similar statements may be found in ERISA's legislative his-
tory. See 1 LEGIS. HIsT. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 204 (remarks of Senator Javits); 2
LEGIs. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 1601, 1604 (remarks of Senator Williams).
198. See generally LEGIs. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7. See, in particular, id. at 205
(remarks of Senator Javits).
199. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1976). See also the House and Senate
Conference Committee's joint explanatory statement on ERISA, H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 294-326 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CoNF. REP.).
200. Kilberg, The Labor Department Perspective, 31 Bus. LAW. 75 (1975).
201. ERISA § 2003, I.R.C. § 4975(e).
202. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(A)(i)(1976).
203. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)(1976).
204. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C)(1976).
One of the most significant reforms produced by ERISA is its prohibition against pen-
sion plan acquisition and holding of securities of the sponsoring employer in excess of ten
percent of the market value of the plan's assets. ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §
1107(a)(2)(1976). Prior to ERISA, trustees would purchase and manipulate the sponsoring




While ERISA's fiduciary requirements are designed to protect
the worker's interest in her pension by strictly proscribing the
kinds of self-dealing and conflicts of interest which led to the
wholesale depredation of trust assets in the past, these require-
ments have been criticized as furthering the interests of the pen-
sion and investment community at the expense of the rights of the
pension beneficiaries. 2°8 While ERISA has been successful in ar-
resting the more overt forms of pension corruption, there is some
evidence that fund assets are still subject to sophisticated methods
of self-interested manipulation and depletion. Two recent research
monographs prepared under the auspices of the Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund have documented significant conflicts of interest, not
uncommon among corporate and union funds, which remain unas-
sailable under ERISA. °7 A study prepared by A. G. Becker, Inc.,
of Chicago, indicates that over the past ten years, 3,000 private
pension funds invested chiefly in stocks and bonds increased in
value an average of only 2.5% a year.20 The impact on pension
fund beneficiaries is great; a one percent change in the rate of re-
turn on the trust portfolio translates into a ten to twenty percent
increase or decrease in pension benefits payable out of the fund.20 9
The stress inherent in ERISA between the interests of em-
ployers and the investment community on the one hand, and the
pension rights of employees on the other, is nowhere more appar-
under the plan. See B. AARON, supra note 95, at 101-02; J. BROOKS, supra note 192, at 13-25.
As the Douglas Committee noted: "[A]n unduly large holding of this type may not be in the
interests of the beneficiaries ... [and] tends to raise the question whether the fund is being
operated for the sole interest of the beneficiaries." S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-
52 (1956).
Employee stock ownership plans (ESOP's) are exempt from the ten percent employer's
securities limitation. ERISA §§ 407(b)(1) & (d)(6), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(b)(1) & (d)(6)(1976).
See C. SCHARF, GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: A REVOLUTIONARY METHOD
FOR INCREASING CORPORATE PROFrrs 26 (1976).
205. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(1976).
206. See remarks of William Winpisinger, of the Machinists Union, in J. RInKIN & R.
BARBER, supra note 8, at 102. For a contrary view, see Note, Public Employee Pensions in
Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARv. L. REV. 992 (1977).
207. R. BLODGETT, supra note 192; and J. BROOKS, supra note 192. See also J. RIFKIN
& R. BARBRP, supra note 8, at 104-24.
208. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 86.
A.G. Becker's 1978 report on the rates of return on 3,500 managed pension fund portfo-
lios indicates that the median annual return for pension and profit sharing funds from 1969
to 1978 has been 2.0% and 2.1% respectively. A.G. BECKER, 1978 PERFORMANCE CHARACTER-
Isrws 16 (1979). This is to be compared with the consumer price index annual inflation rate
for the same period, which was 6.7%. Id. at 5.
209. N. LEVIN, supra note 175, at 73.
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ent than in ERISA's minimum vesting and eligibility require-
ments2 10 These provisions ostensibly guarantee the pension expec-
tations of American workers. Their net effect, however, is to ensure
the stability of the fund by reducing the number of persons who
are entitled to pension benefits through eligibility screening.21
ERISA's participation and vesting sections must be scruti-
nized to determine whether ERISA creates an entitlement in a
particular pension. Under ERISA, an entitlement is established
when an individual's pension has vested, that is, has become a
nonforfeitable interest recognized by law. In order for her pension
to vest, a worker must satisfy a series of conditions precedent set
out as minimum standards in ERISA.212 Then and only then will a
legally cognizable interest in a pension be created.
An analysis of the way pension eligibility requirements operate
reveals that an entitlement to pension benefits is not readily estab-
lished, even under the most liberal minimum standards set out in
the pension reform act. For instance, presuming that an employee
falls within ERISA's coverage provisions,21 she must then satisfy
the conditions precedent to plan participation"" so that years of
210. ERISA §§ 202, 203, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1053 (1976).
211. The eligibility requirements, by reducing the amount of money paid out in bene-
fits, concomitantly increase the overall balance of the fund, thereby (1) benefiting the em-
ployer by reducing his future pension obligations and (2) enhancing the effectiveness of the
fund as an investment device, since long-term stability of funds is essential for profitable
investment and efficient capital management. Theoretically, no real benefit is derived, since
each denial of benefits is part of an overall actuarial scheme which predetermines the
amount of fund contributions necessary to meet the unfunded liabilities of the plan. See D.
McGuL, supra note 112, at 305-425.
212. ERISA §§ 202, 203, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1053 (1976). These provisions are pivotal
to ERISA; should a plan fail to meet these minimum standards, it will not constitute a
qualified trust under I.R.C. § 401(a) and thus not be entitled to receive the generous tax
benefits afforded to private pension plans under ERISA. See ERISA §§ 1011, 1012, LR.C. §§
410, 411.
213. Under § 201 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976), the participation and vesting
requirements do not apply to governmental plans, church plans, excess benefit plans and
assorted others. See also CoNp. REP., supra note 199, at 260-61.
214. ERISA § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A)(1976), which states in pertinent
part- "No pension plan may require, as a condition of participation in the plan, that an
employee complete a period of service with the employer or employers maintaining the plan
extending beyond the later of the following dates-
(i) the date on which the employee attains the age of 25; or
(ii) the date on which he completes 1 year of service."
However, there are exceptions. A plan may extend the service requirement to three
years if the plan provides for full and immediate vesting. ERISA § 202(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1052(a)(1)(B)(1976).
A plan may also exclude altogether employees who are within five years of the plan's
normal retirement age. ERISA § 202(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(B)(1976). See also
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service which accrue may be counted toward the satisfaction of a
second set of eligibility requirements which determine whether the
employee will ultimately receive benefits.
Once the minimum participation requirements are satisfied,
15
the employee-plan participant21 s must then satisfy the minimum
vesting standards under section 203 of the Act.217 ERISA requires
that plans adopt one of three vesting formulae,1 8 which determine
when the pension vests, as well as one of three benefit accrual
schedules,219 which determine the rate and amount of benefit ac-
crual. The most common method adopted is "cliff vesting," where
an employee becomes entitled to 100% of her benefits after ten
years of service,220  at which time her pension becomes
nonforfeitable.221
Prior to the passage of ERISA, there were no vesting require-
ments mandated by federal law, and as a result, onerous eligibility
requirements often led to wholesale denial of employees' pension
benefits.222 Even under ERISA, however, a variety of circum-
stances can conspire to deprive an employee of all pension contri-
butions made on her behalf. For instance, because most employers
prefer the ten-year "cliff vesting" requirement permitted by
CoNF. REP., supra note 199, at 262.
215. ERISA § 202(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(B)(1976).
216. Defined by ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)(1976).
217. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976).
218. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(A)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A)-(C)(1976). They are, respec-
tively- (1)"Cliff" vesting-100% vesting after ten years of service, irrespective of age, with
no vesting at all during the first ten years.
(2)"Graded" vesting-Progressive vesting over fifteen years of service, with a nonfor-
feitable right to 25% of the pension accruing after at least five years of service and 100%
vesting occurring after fifteen years of service, and with gradational vesting occurring in
between as set out in the Act.
(3)"Rule of 45" vesting-Where the pension vests progressively based on the sum of the
employee's age and length of service, with a forty year-old employee with five years of ser-
vice accruing a 50% nonforfeitable interest, and all employees with ten years of service
accruing at least a 50% nonforfeitable interest.
See CoNF. REP., supra note 199, at 268-69.
219. ERISA § 204(b)(1)(A)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(A)-(C)(1976). See CONF. REP.,
supra note 199, at 273-75.
220. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A)(1976). This method is generally
preferred because it reduces administrative costs involved in accounting for partially vested
rights. It is particularly desirable in industries where there is a high labor turnover, since an
employee must work a minimum of ten years to accrue any benefit credits.
221. ERISA § 3(19), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19)(1976), defines "nonforfeitable" as "a claim
obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit
under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service, which is unconditional, and
which is legally enforceable against the plan."
222. See note 140 supra.
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ERISA, well over half, of those employees covered will not gain an
"eititlement" to their pension benefits since labor mobility studies
indicate that most employees change jobs prior to the time when
their pension rights would vest.
23
Similarly, an employee may work for ten or more years, yet
not accrue any benefit credits because of one or more temporary
interruptions in continuous work performance, called "breaks-in-
service." For instance, if a worker is unable to work due to preg-
nancy, disability, layoff or termination, she may lose some or all of
her credits, depending on the length of the break-in-service and
the amount of benefit credit accrued.224
Should a pension plan terminate prior to an employee's inter-
est having vested, she would lose all benefits accrued on her behalf,
since the system of government termination insurance enacted by
ERISA22 5 covers only vested, nonforfeitable benefits.'"  This af-
fects a significant, if unascertainable, number of persons, given the
fact that over 1,000 pension plans terminate each year for eco-
nomic reasons.227
Even if an employee succeeds in completing ten continuous
years of service and becomes entitled to receive 100% of the bene-
fits determined to be nonforfeitable under the Act, that employee
still must reach normal retirement age2 8 to actually receive full
223. The Department of Labor indicates that in 1972, for instance, the median length
of employment for persons covered under private pension plans was 8.6 years. U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR; COVERAGE & VESTING OF FuLL TnME EMPLOYEES
UNDER PRIVATE RTRME r PLANS 19 (Sept. 1973). See also M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 137,
at 49-84.
ERISA does permit reciprocity agreements and tax-free rollovers, allowing a degree of
portability, whereby an employee can transfer her vested interest in her pension to another
retirement system under some circumstances. See CONF. REP., supra note 199, at 341-42.
Unfortunately most private pension plans do not have reciprocity clauses. See U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, DIGEST OF SELECTED PENSION PLANS (1979).
As one commentator put it: "The older worker who must forfeit his pension if he
chooses to change employers is uncomfortably close to serfdom." SCHULZ, PENSION AsPECTS
OF THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 39 (1970).
224. ERISA § 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1976); CONF. REP., supra note 199, at 268-
70.
225. ERISA §§ 4001-4068, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1368 (1976).
226. ERISA § 4022(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1976). See also Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979), aft'd, 100 S. Ct. 1723 (1980).
227. DEP'T OF TREASURY & DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDY OF PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS,
1972 FINAL REPORT (Aug. 1973), cited in Brief of PROD, Women's Lobby, Inc., and Institute
for Public Interest Representation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 25, Team-
sters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
228. Defined under the Act as the lowest age specified in the plan at which eligible
pension plan participants are permitted to retire with full benefits. This cannot exceed 65,
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benefits.2 9 Indeed, while vested rights to an accrued benefit attrib-
utable to employer contributions are generally not forfeitable, they
can be forfeited where the employee-plan participant dies prior to
reaching the normal retirement age specified in the plan.30 Vested
rights can also be forfeited due to retroactive plan amendments,3 1
re-employment of the employee, 2  and the voluntary withdrawal
of mandatory contributions.233
A case pending before the Ninth Circuit illustrates ERISA's
weaknesses regarding workers' pension rights. s' Mario Hernandez
was a participant in a pension plan administered by the Southern
Nevada Culinary and Bartenders Pension Trust, which required
ten years of employee service for pension benefits to vest. The plan
also required that the employee retire at the age of sixty-two to
receive benefits. Mario Hernandez worked thirteen and one-half
years in employment covered under the multi-employer plan and
thus had a 100% vested interest in his pension.3 On October 16,
1977, Mario Hernandez died at the age of sixty-one years and nine
months, just three months short of his sixty-second birthday and
three months short of reaching normal retirement age under the
plan.
America Hernandez, the widow of Mario Hernandez, applied
for his pension benefits from the trust and was turned down, even
though her late husband's pension was 100% vested at the time of
his death. She then brought an action for declaratory relief and an
accounting in the District Court of Nevada, which found that,
under ERISA, a pension plan may deny all retirement benefits to
an employee's beneficiary if that employee dies prior to reaching
the plan's normal retirement age. 36 Accordingly, such a denial is
which is the most common age specified. ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24)(1976).
229. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(A)(1976).
230. Id.; CoNF. REP., supra note 199, at 271.
231. ERISA §§ 203(a)(3)(C), 302(c)(8), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053(a)(3)(C), 1082(c)(8) (1976);
Co~w. REP., supra note 199, at 271.
232. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B)(1976); CONF. REP., supra note
199, at 271.
233. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(D)(1976); CONF. REP., supra note
199, at 271.
234. Hernandez v. Southern Nev. Culinary & Bartenders Pension Trust, No. 79-36 (D.
Nev. Sept. 4, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-3616 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1979).
235. In addition, Mr. Hernandez had elected the joint and survivor annuity option,
which would have entitled his beneficiary to 50% of the amount which he was eligible to
receive at the time of his death.
236. No. 79-36, slip op. at 5-6 (D. Nev. Sept. 4, 1979).
"Plaintiff urges this court to hold that because the contributions by the employer were
made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, they are in lieu of wages which would
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not a prohibited forfeiture under ERISA,"7 even though an em-
ployee's interest is fully vested; thus, America Hernandez was enti-
tled to neither benefits from, nor an'accounting of, her late hus-
band's pension.
As ERISA is the non-constitutional source which must form
the basis of any claim of pension entitlement cognizable under the
Entitlement Doctrine, it must be subjected to more critical scru-
tiny to determine whether, and to what extent, it extends protec-
tion to the day-to-day pension expectancies of millions of Ameri-
can workers. While ERISA has been hailed as offering "more
benefits and rights and success in the area of labor-management
than almost anything in the history of this country,"2 8 it might
more accurately be characterized as representing "a mirage of re-
form but not its substance.
'23 9
The "mirage" of ERISA is due to the disparity between the
public pronouncements of its drafters and the actual substance of
the bill itself. For instance, it is clear from the legislative history of
ERISA that its drafters saw pensions as a form of wages to which
the worker is entitled. Senator Harrison Williams, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, stated during
hearings on ERISA: "I would stress that pensions are not gratui-
ties, like a gold watch bestowed as a gift by the employer on retire-
ment. They represent savings which the worker has earned in the
form of deferred payment for his labors."24 0
Similarly, Senator Jacob Javits, co-author and chief sponsor of
ERISA, noted:
The fact of the matter is that the private pension plan is a
means for transferring earnings during the working years into in-
come for a decent living in the older years. The worker "works"
for that pension the same way he "works" for his wages or
salary .... 241
I believe that [ERISA] has settled in an indisputable fashion,
the legal status of private pensions. Whatever lingering doubts
may have persisted prior to its passage, the law tells us that pri-
otherwise have been paid to the employee and therefore constitute employee contributions
which belong to the estate of the decedent. Such an interpretation is contrary to the clear
intent of the Act." Id. But see notes 240-42 and accompanying text infra.
237. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(A)(1976).
238. Remarks by President Gerald Ford on signing the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 1974 PuB. PAPERS, GERALD R. FORD 76-77.
239. Professor M. Bernstein, quoted in R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, supra note 111, at
117.
240. 2 LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 1605.
241. Id. at 1609.
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vate pensions are a form of deferred wages and not a form of gra-
tuity to be offered and withdrawn at the whim of the employer.
In short the "gold watch" theory of pensions is dead for once and
for all.
24 2
Nonetheless, ERISA creates in a worker no entitlement to her
pension prior to the satisfaction of the plan's eligibility require-
ments. In balancing the interests of both the employer and the ec-
onomic community against the right of employees to the fruit of
their deferred wages, Congress has promulgated a bill which per-
petuates an actuarially-based eligibility system which is a holdover
from the gratuity theory243 and which results in extensive pension
deprivation..
Allowing Congress to determine whether a claim has constitu-
tional stature short-weights the interests of pension plan benefi-
ciaries, who are all but excluded from congressional deliberation
about pension rights.24" This cannot be over-stressed. Employers'
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce seek to legislatively
define pension rights as narrowly as possible, to minimize benefits
paid out and to lower the employer's total contribution obligation.
Investment institutions like Morgan Guaranty Trust Company are
not likely to encourage legislation which would reduce the total
value of the investment monies under their managerial control.
Even labor unions, who are often the sole representatives of work-
242. Quoted in Brief of PROD, Women's Lobby, Inc., supra note 227, at 14 n.7.
243. Ralph Nader has proposed an alternative mode of pension fund organization sim-
ilar in some respects to the present IRA/Keogh system. While a debate as to its merits is
beyond the scope of this note, it bears study as it recognizes an immediate, truly nonforfeit-
able interest in an employee to her pension from the time of the first contribution. See R.
NADER & K. BLACKWELL, supra note 111, at 163-68 (Appendix C). See also J. BROOKS, supra
note 192, at 8.
244. As Ralph Nader has noted: "Up to now, pension legislation has been formulated
in the virtual absence of constituent pressure-that is, pressure from employees who hope to
benefit from the system. Without their involvement, legislative reforms will continue to do
too little. . . . How much stronger would they be if congressmen were as familiar with
employees' desires as with the desires of employers? How much stronger would they be if
beneficiaries conducted even half the lobbying efforts of the pension industry? We do not
yet know the answer." R. NAnER & K. BLACKWRLL, supra note 111, at 123-24.
The dramatic imbalance of organizational resources weighing heavily against the em-
ployee-plan participant is illustrated by the lineup of amici curiae who submitted briefs in
the case of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). Organizations submitting amicus briefs
for the trust fund included the United States government, the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, the American Bankers Association, the ERISA Industry
Committee (ERIC), National Coordinating Committee for Multi-employer Plans, the Amer-
ican Academy of Actuaries and the American Bar Association. Submitting briefs for the
respondent, Mr. Daniel, were the Securities Exchange Commission, the Gray Panthers and
three public interest organizations joining in one petition. See TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL, BRIEFS
Amici CuRIAE, 12 LAW REPRum, LAB. SEmuI (1979).
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ers' interests in the legislative process, have an interest in pension
plans which is often not distinguishable from that of employers,
since unions are charged with defending the Taft-Hartley funds to
which they appoint trustees.245
Though ERISA does establish minimum eligibility standards
more liberal than those imposed by most employers prior to
ERISA's enactment, the number of workers who will benefit from
the new standards will not approach the number still denied bene-
fit and control. It has been estimated that for those pension plans
in operation prior to ERISA's passage whose eligibility require-
ments were similar to ERISA's, as many as 75% of the benefi-
ciaries did not receive benefits of any kind.246 As one commentator
put it: "[W]hile ERISA may offer hope for a few, it is certainly not
the savior of the many. "247
B. Pension Rights Under Contract
The trust indenture and the plan document itself are the con-
tracts which must be scrutinized to determine the existence, if any,
of a pension benefit entitlement. So extensive is ERISA's coverage
that, with few exceptions, virtually all private plans now conform
to the strictures of ERISA.2 48 However, since ERISA sets out only
minimum vesting and participation standards, plans may still pro-
vide more liberal eligibility requirements, such as immediate vest-
ing, thereby expanding the pension rights of plan participants.249
There are approximately 450,000 to 500,000 pension plans in
this country, covering as much as one-half of the American work
force, or between forty and fifty million workers.2 50 The United
States Department of Labor publishes the Digest of Selected Pen-
sion Plans251 which summarizes the key features of specific plan
245. See Renfrew, Fiduciary Responsibilities Under the Pension Reform Act, 32 Bus.
LAw. 1829 (1977).
246. Estimate by Professor M. Bernstein, quoted in Miller & Dudowitz, The Unfin-
ished Task of Private Pension Reform, 13 TRIAL 18, 19 (May 1977).
247. Id.
248. ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976). The most significant form of retirement
plan exempt from much of ERISA's coverage is the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).
See note 204 supra.
249. ERISA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(d) (1976).
As Senator Williams stated: "Its provisions are only minimum standards, and no em-
ployer is impeded from building upon or improving these minimum requirements.
"Improvement upon the design, coverage, and benefits is a matter of free choice by
employers." 2 LEGIs. HIsT. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 1601.
250. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
251. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTics, DEP'T OF LABOR, DIGEST OF SELECTED PENSION
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agreements throughout the country. The plans are not selected as
a representative sample of all private pension plans in this coun-
try; rather they are chosen because they cover a large number of
employees in a broad cross-section of industries nationwide.5 2
Thus while they are not a statistically accurate index of the distri-
bution of particular plan provisions, they do indicate what private
pension plans, on the whole, provide the average worker in the way
of pension rights.
A survey of the plans contained in the Department of Labor
Digest reveals that few plans, if any, provide more liberal provi-
sions than the minimum standards set out in ERISA. In fact, all of
the 148 plans summarized have vesting provisions, most requiring
ten years of service. Almost all of the plans also have a minimum
age requirement setting the time of retirement generally at be-
tween 62 and 65 years of age.
Thus, pension plans, while permitted to provide more rights
than set out in ERISA, almost invariably do not do so. Given this,
they cannot be looked to as a significant source of entitlement to
pension benefits.
C. Summation: Pensions as an Entitlement
Statutory and contractual provisions regulating and defining
the nature of pension rights illustrate the weaknesses inherent in
the Entitlement Doctrine. While the courts have increasingly rec-
ognized pensions as a form of deferred compensation, federal law
and private pension plans treat them as little more than gratuities,
held in trust for the employee and vesting only after years of
service.
The fact that federal pension statutes operate to deprive em-
ployees of both control over, and benefit of, their pension funds
reflects the pluralist 25 s nature of Congress' responsiveness to pow-
erful organized interests seeking to maintain control over what
Senator Harrison Williams has called "the largest single source of
virtually unregulated capital in our country. '25 4 While the Court
PLANS (1979).
252. Id. at iii & 359-63.
253. Pluralism-the process by which organized groups seek to maximize their inter-
ests in the political market place-was the cornerstone of the Framers' view of democratic
action. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST (A. Hamilton, J. Jay & J. Madison).
254. 2 LEGIS. HIST. OF ERISA, supra note 7, at 1600. The President's Commission on
Pension Policy has stated that "issues related to the ownership and control of pension fund
assets are extremely important," and went on to recommend that "issues related to the
ownership, control and investment of pension fund assets... be investigated to identify
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may rightly wish to defer to congressional expertise in a matter
clearly as complex as national pension reform, it must recognize
that congressional deliberations on ERISA did not comprehend the
constitutional repercussions of imposing conditions on a worker's
receipt of benefits which are part of her compensation package. It
is the Court's function to preserve the rights of citizens under the
nation's charter, regardless of legislative action.255
It is in the interest of employers to condition eligibility for
pensions so as to afford few rights to employees. The Entitlement
Doctrine, whereby the Court looks to a non-constitutional source,
such as contract or statute, to determine if one's interest is suffi-
cient to be constitutional property, allows Congress and employers
to determine whether employees are entitled to their pension bene-
fits. ERISA and employers' pension plans thus determine whether
workers have an interest in their pension that goes beyond the
"contingent expectancy" described by the Daniel amici.256 How-
ever, to condition the finding of a constitutional property right on
the terms of a statute or contract, when neither reflects the inter-
est of the party claiming the right, debases an important constitu-
tional guarantee. The Court fosters tragic results with this circular-
ity-if the Congress and employers fail to allow the worker the
pension for which she has worked and upon which she has relied,
the Court will conclude that she must therefore not have been en-
titled to it.
Conclusion
This note has attempted to assess whether pensions are con-
stitutional property, and to sketch the economic and legal parame-
ters of the pension rights issue. Whether constitutional protection
for employees who are divested of control and ultimate benefit of
their pensions will be extended in a particular case depends, as the
present Supreme Court has noted, upon whether an individual can
claim an "entitlement" to the benefit. Whether an entitlement ex-
ists depends upon whether "existing rules of understandings" such
as contracts or state or federal statutes define the claimed interest
as an entitlement.
and clarify areas for further study." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 51.
255. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D.R.I. 1973), motion denied,
482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
256. Brief for Gray Panthers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8, Team-
sters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). See also Brief for Petitioner Teamsters at 40.
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As was noted earlier, both federal pension statutes and em-
ployer pension fund agreements define pensions as little more than
gratuities, affording only those rights delineated by the agreement
itself. Most agreements spell out eligibility requirements designed
to protect the fund itself from depletion and to reduce the em-
ployer's pension payment liabilities. Thus under the Entitlement
Doctrine, employees who have not satisfied the agreement's re-
quirements are afforded no constitutional protection when they are
deprived of their pension benefits.
Pensions are paid by the employer as a form of deferred com-
pensation for employment services presently rendered. It is this
deferred compensation which most workers look forward to as
their primary source of economic security for their retirement
years. Because of minimum eligibility requirements which are pre-
sent in most pension plan agreements and in federal pension law,
most employees will be denied all or part of their pensions, regard-
less of representations and expectations to the contrary.
While such eligibility requirements guard the sanctity of the
fund itself, they are contrary to the operative premise behind pen-
sions-that they are compensation for services presently rendered
by the employee. The fact that such compensation is deferred by
agreement should not divest the employee of either ultimate bene-
fit or present control of the wages of her own toil.
The inadequacy of the constitutional protection available to
persons who often work all of their productive years only to be
denied their retirement security highlights both the inadequacy of
the Entitlement Doctrine and the legal pre-eminence assigned to
the pension fund itself at the expense of the purported
beneficiaries.
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